AGREEMENTS CHANGING THE
FORUM FOR RESOLVING
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
JAMES

A.

HENDERSON, JR.*

I
INTRODUCTION

The other articles in this symposium dealing with the role of private
agreements in the medical malpractice context address issues that are
primarily substantive: What standards of care should be applied in judging
provider conduct? Should tort recoveries be subject to dollar limits? Might a
workable no-fault system be devised for medical malpractice claims? In
contrast to these substantive inquiries, this article focuses on procedure:
Holding the traditional tort liability rules more or less constant, might
questions of provider fault, causation, and damages be resolved in a forum
other than a court of law? The first section of this article examines binding
arbitration as a possible alternative to litigation. The second section explores
the possibility of relying on pretrial screening panels.
II
BINDING ARBITRATION

The major issues addressed in this section are whether and to what extent
American courts will honor ex ante agreements' between health care
providers and recipients to have claims resolved by binding arbitration. The
underlying premise of most proposals to submit medical malpractice claims to
arbitration is that, viewed before the fact of an iatrogenic injury, arbitration is
a preferable means of dispute resolution for everyone involved. Litigation
imposes substantial costs on all parties to a medical malpractice claim; 2 with
its informal procedures 3 and its bar against appeals, 4 arbitration resolves
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1. "Ex ante" refers to the fact that the agreements are entered into before the provision of the
health care that causes injury. "Ex post," used hereafter in the text, refers to the period after the
plaintiff learns of his injury.
2. See Sohn, An Examination of Alternatives to Suit in Doctor-PatientDisputes, 48 ALB. L. REV. 669,
679 (1984) ("Arbitration costs are usually lower than the costs of formal litigation."); see also Redish,
Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: ConstitutionalImplications, 55 TEx. L. REV.
759, 768 (1977) (arbitration will reduce costs).
3. See Sohn, supra note 2, at 679 ("Arbitral procedures are relatively simple.").
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claims more quickly and less expensively. 5 Recipients suffering relatively
minor injuries that might not be worth a lawyer's time to litigate on a
contingent fee basis may find arbitration to be a more viable, and thus

preferable, alternative. 6 Badly injured health care recipients tend to prefer
jury trials when given a choice ex post. However, answers to the complex
question of the relative advantages of litigation and arbitration are not clear.
It is reasonable to assume that some recipients, choosing ex ante, would
prefer arbitration over jury trial.
Providers have several reasons, in addition to the savings in transaction

costs, for preferring arbitration. First, arbitration is a private affair, thus
reducing the reputational losses associated with being a defendant (even an
ultimately successful defendant) in a public malpractice trial. 7 Second, the
arbitrator (or arbitration panel) can be so selected as to possess greater
technical expertise than law-trained judges and lay jurors, thus reducing the
likelihood that errors in assessment of provider fault will occur.8 This last
point may, of course, shade over into a somewhat different, perhaps less
appropriate, reason for providers' preference for arbitration:
The
decisionmaker(s) may be chosen so as to be biased in the providers' favor.
This issue is considered below in assessing the validity of certain types of
arbitration agreements.
What, then, of the likelihood that courts will uphold ex ante agreements to
submit medical malpractice claims to binding arbitration? From a more
general perspective, we have come a long way from the time when courts,
perhaps wary of attempts to curtail their jurisdiction, were reluctant to
enforce contracts to submit legal disputes to binding arbitration. 9 Today, in
over two-thirds of the states, general statutes authorize agreements to
4. See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAw § 7511 (McKinney 1980); Sohn, supra note 2, at 680 ("Arbitral
decisions enjoy a benefit of finality which judicial determinations do not because the grounds for
appealing or modifying an arbitrator's award are extremely limited.").
5. See Sohn, supra note 2, at 679-80 ("Decisions are reached more rapidly in arbitration than in
litigation[;I "overburdened courts force worthy plaintiffs to face long delays before they can obtain a
remedy."); see also Henderson, Contractual Problems in the Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate A!edical
Mllalpractice,58 VA. L. REV. 947, 960 (1972) ("A common objective of the contractual approaches is to
avoid the costs and delays of litigation.").
6. See Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 17 Cal. 3d 699, 711-12, 552 P.2d 1178, 1186, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 882, 890 (1976).
7. See Redish, supra note 2, at 768 (arbitration reduces publicity).
8. See Sohn, supra note 2, at 679 ("Arbitration hearings are conducted before experts in the
field of knowledge involved in the dispute. A formal trial . . .is conducted before a judge who may
be unfamiliar with the technical subject matter which he must consider to decide the case."). The
question of whether the makeup of the arbitration panel required in a Michigan statute violates a
claimant's right to due process has produced a split of opinion. Compare Brown v. Siang, 107 Mich.
App. 91, 309 N.W.2d 575 (1982) (plaintiff must prove that statute violates due process), with Jackson
v. Detroit Memorial Hosp., 110 Mich. App. 202, 312 N.W.2d 212 (1981) (makeup of panel in itself is
unconstitutional). MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 600.5044(2) (West 1984) provides for a panel of three
arbitrators with one physician.
9. See Henderson, supra note 5, at 970 ("An undertaking to arbitrate will not lightly be imputed
by the courts. In fact, . . . it is still common practice to apply to arbitration clauses a more rigorous
test of agreement than that applied to other contractual provisions."); see also Madden v. Kaiser
Found. Hosp., 17 Cal. 3d 699, 706, 552 P.2d 1178, 1182, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882, 886 (1976) ("The early
common law courts did not favor arbitration, and greatly limited the powers of arbitrators.").
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arbitrate;' 0 and in a smaller number of states, statutes specifically authorize
(and to some extent regulate) arbitration agreements relating to medical
malpractice claims.'
The issue of the constitutionality of these special
statutes is beyond the scope of this paper.' 2 It suffices to say that most of
these statutes have passed constitutional muster when challenged' 3 and that
the availability of such a statute helps to substantiate the validity of an
4
arbitration agreement that conforms to its terms.'
In most jurisdictions, the validity of agreements to arbitrate depends on
general contract law principles. Most often, in the recurring context of a
badly injured health care recipient trying to escape the arbitration agreement
and obtain a jury trial, the question is whether at the time the agreement was
entered into, the recipient, or someone authorized to act for the recipient, was
adequately informed of the relevant implications and was in a position to
exercise reasonably free choice in the matter. The sort of agreement that is
most impervious to attack is one entered into between a prepaid health
benefits provider and the representative(s) of a group of recipient-enrollees
where it can be shown that the terms of the contract (including the arbitration
agreement) are relatively fair on their face and were negotiated at arm's
length.15 At the other extreme, the most vulnerable sort of agreement would
be one entered into by an individual recipient seeking emergency medical
treatment who signed the contract, unfair on its face, in haste after being told
16
he could either sign it or go sleep in the snow.
Obviously, there is a great deal of room for variation, both in fact patterns
and in judicial responses thereto, between these two extremes. The fact
patterns involved in recent appellate decisions may be grouped into four
categories. In the first, claimants argue that their consent to submit to
arbitration was not freely or knowingly given. "I was not told about the
arbitration clause, nor did I understand the implications" is a typical
argument. Some courts refuse to listen to such pleas when the medical
10. For a list of citations to these so-called "modern arbitration statutes" see Ladimer &
Solomon, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: Laws, Programs, Cases, 653 INS. LJ. 335, 362 (1977).
11. Id. at 358-61.
12. See generally Hurst, Alternatives to Litigation: Pretrial Screening and Arbitration of Iedical
Malpractice Claims: Has Missouri Taken a Giant Step Backward?, 50 UMKC L. REV. 188-209 (1982);
Mengel, The Constitutionaland Contractual Challenges to Michigan's Medical MalpracticeArbitration Act, 59
U. DET. J. URB. L. 319 (1982); Redish, supra note 2.
13. See generally Mengel, supra note 12.
14. See Ramirez v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 746, 749, 163 Cal. Rptr. 223, 224 (1980)
("[A] patient who has signed an admission agreement which complies with [CAL CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 1295 (West 1982)] . . . and which requires arbitration of all medical malpractice claims may resist
arbitration on the ground that the agreement was not entered into knowingly and voluntarily.");
Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 17 Cal. 3d 699, 713, 552 P.2d 1178, 1187, 131 Cal. Rptr. 882, 891
(1976) ("Legislature enacted the specific language of the California Arbritation Act [CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 1280-1295 (West 1982)] to govern the enforcement of arbitration agreements"). See
generally Redish, supra note 2.
15. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 5, at 958.
16. See Henderson, supra note 5, at 993-97. The Ohio statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2711.23(A) (Baldwin 1984), provides that the agreement must state that the continued provision of
medical care is not predicated on the patient's agreement to submit his claims to arbitration.

[Vol. 49: No. 2

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

treatment received was not emergency in nature and when the agreement was
both signed ahead of time and fair on its face.1 7 A larger number of courts
will conduct a preliminary hearing to allow the judge to determine the factual
issues relevant to the validity of the agreement to arbitrate.1 8 Reading the
recent cases, one gets the impression that a claimant must show some element
of

egregious

conduct

on

the

provider's

part,

such

as

fraud

or

misrepresentation, in order for the court to set aside the agreement to
arbitrate.' 9 It must be emphasized, however, that the provider is not
insulated from the risks attendant to the factfinding process itself; and some
courts appear to be looking for an excuse to allow the claimant to avoid
20
arbitration and get into court with his malpractice claim.

The second category of arbitration agreement cases involves claimants
who argue that even if the agreement is to some extent valid and binding, they
did not sign the agreement and therefore are not bound by it. On the whole,
courts have been willing to hold nonsignatory claimants bound by a consent
to arbitrate given by someone in a position to represent the claimants'
interests. Thus, Army depot employees were held bound by the consent
given on their behalf by the Civil Service Commission notwithstanding their
argument that none of their elected representatives participated in the
negotiations. 2' In similar fashion, a minor child is bound by his parents'
consent in a group benefits contract,2 2 even for injuries allegedly caused by
prenatal care provided to his mother.2 3 In addition, a wife bringing an action
for her husband's death, arguing that her rights are not derivative under the
wrongful death statute and that therefore she is free as a nonsignatory to sue
in tort, will be held bound by her husband's consent to arbitrate.2 4 A typical
case of this latter type would involve a group health benefits program to whichthe signatory spouse subscribes on a "family plan" basis; when the agreement
to arbitrate is contained in a contract between one spouse and the provider of
specified care on a one-shot basis, the nonsignatory spouse bringing a
25
nonderivative tort action may not be bound by the agreement.
17. See, e.g., Horn v. Cooke, 118 Mich. App. 325, 740 N.W.2d 558 (1982) (court will hold
hearing concerning illiterate recipient's allegation that she was fraudulently induced to agree, but
not concerning allegations that she had not read the agreement or did not understand it).
18. See, e.g., Ramirez v Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 746, 163 Cal Rptr. 223 (1980); McCloy
v. Dorfman, 123 Mich. App. 710, 333 N.W.2d 338 (1983); Miner v. Walden, 101 Misc. 2d 814, 442
N.Y.S.2d 335 (1979).
19. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 746, 754-55, 163 Cal. Rptr. 223, 228
(1980); McCloy v. Dorfman, 123 Mich. App. 710, 710, 333 N.W.2d 338, 340 (1983).
20. See, e.g., Miner v. Walden, 101 Misc. 2d 814, 422 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1979) (form stated
recipient's signature was "required;" provider was a doctor with many years of college, medical, and
dental school training, while plaintiff had only an eleventh grade education).
21. See Dinong v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 845, 162 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1980).
22. See Doyle v. Giuliucci, 62 Cal. 2d 606, 401 P.2d 1, 43 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1965).
23. See Wilson v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 141 Cal. App. 3d 891, 190 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1983).
24. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 413, 152 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1979). But see
Rhodes v. California Hosp. Medical Center, 76 Cal. App. 3d 606, 143 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1978).
25. See, e.g., Rhodes v. California Hosp. Medical Center, 76 Cal. App. 3d 606, 143 Cal. Rptr. 59
(1978).
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A third category of cases involves attempts by claimants to construe the
agreements, conceded to be valid and binding on them, in such a way as to
avoid their application to the tort cases being brought. Thus, in a recent
California case, the plaintiff sought to resist the provider-defendant's motion
to compel arbitration on the ground that the amended complaint contained
an intentional tort count, a basis for recovery that was not included in the
arbitration agreement. The court of appeals granted the defendant's motion,
pointing out that while an introductory section of the relevant California
statute seemed to limit it to negligence cases, the contractual language
mandated by the statute was broader and included intentional torts in the
26
category of disputes which could be decided by arbitration.
Another subset of this third category of "contract construction" cases
involves tort actions brought by signatory plaintiffs against nonsignatory
defendants. Clearly, an agreement to arbitrate entered into by a health care
recipient and a provider does not bar tort actions by the recipient against
providers who are not parties to the agreement. But may the recipient avoid
the agreement even with respect to the signatory provider by joining the
signatory provider as a tort defendant with nonsignatory providers and
arguing that the signatory provider is an indispensable party? A leading
California decision suggests that he may not; the recipient cannot avoid an
otherwise valid agreement to arbitrate by joining signatory and nonsignatory
27
defendants in a single tort action.
The final category of cases involves agreements whose terms can be
attacked as unfair. Thus, an intermediate appellate court in New York set
aside a contract to arbitrate on the ground, among others, that the health care
provider retained the option-the only such option available to either partyto take the recipient to court to collect unpaid fees. 2 8 An intermediate
appellate court in California responded in similar fashion to an agreement
that gave the provider, but not the recipient, the right to reject an unfavorable
arbitration decision and resubmit the matter to arbitration. 29 Additionally, an
intermediate court in Michigan held unconstitutional a statutory provision
that one member of the required three-member arbitration panel must be a
physician or, if the claim is against a hospital only, a hospital administrator. 30
The court concluded that the requirement denied the recipient's due process
3
right to a fair and impartial tribunal. '
In addition to the requirement that the agreement to arbitrate be fair to
recipients, courts have also reviewed arbitration decisions to make sure that
the procedures actually followed conformed to the procedures expressly or
26. See Herrera v. Superior Court, 158 Cal. App. 3d 255, 204 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1984).
27. See Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 17 Cal. 3d 699, 714, 552 P.2d 1178, 1188, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 882, 892 (1976).

28.
29.
(1980).
30.
31.

See Miner v. Walden, 101 Misc. 2d 814, 442 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1979).
See Beynon v. Garden Grove Medical Group, 100 Cal. App. 3d 698, 161 Cal. Rptr. 146
See McCloy v. Dorfman, 123 Mich. App. 710, 333 N.W.2d 338 (1983).
Id. at 713, 333 N.W.2d at 339.
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impliedly called for in the agreements. Thus, a California court granted a
recipient's petition to vacate an arbitration panel's decision for the defendant
providers when the proof indicated that the medical member of the
arbitration panel had not disclosed an ongoing business relationship with the
32
law firm representing the defendants.
In reflecting on these judicial reactions to agreements to submit medical
malpractice claims to binding arbitration, two general propositions emerge.
First, providers relying on such agreements must expect a measure ofjudicial
scrutiny on a case-by-case basis; it is all but impossible to nail down the
validity issue once and for all ahead of time. Second, for the agreement to
pass muster, it must appear to be fair to the recipient. Taken together, these
propositions present a somewhat troubling picture for future reliance on
arbitration by health care providers.
The source of concern may be easily identified. To the extent that
arbitration agreements must make significant concessions to prospective
patient-plaintiffs in order to be acceptable to courts, they may lose their
appeal to providers. Arbitration works in commercial settings because it
relies on the willingness of both sides to trust the arbitrator to try to reach
decisions that fit into the fabric of the give-and-take of the marketplace out of
which the dispute arises. Both sides are likely to be in an ongoing
relationship, and will have opportunities in the future to adjust their positions
in light of the outcome. Additionally, both sides value the privacy afforded by
arbitration.
In the typical medical malpractice context, only the provider is in a
position analogous to the firm in traditional commercial arbitration. The
provider's ongoing activities are jeopardized by the tort claim; he or she
would prefer to resolve the dispute as quickly and privately as possible. In
contrast, the recipient-claimant is a one-shot player, substantially outside the
system of health care provision. Viewed ex post, the recipient has no interest
in protecting the fabric of customary dealings regarding the provision and
receipt of health care; indeed, the greater the disruption caused by the claim,
and the greater the publicity generated by it, the greater are the recipient's
chances to exact a favorable settlement in a tort action. Thus, there is an
unavoidable tension inherent in submitting medical malpractice claims to
binding arbitration. At the level of "deeper rhythms," there is a nagging
"arrhythmia," if you will. The parties may arrive at an agreement ex ante; but
the "fit" between process and controversy is not exactly right-and thus
pressures persist for courts to set aside agreements that appear
asymmetrically beneficial to health care providers.
What will the future-the next ten years or so-hold for attempts to move
medical malpractice out of court and into binding arbitration (again assuming
substantive liability rules remain essentially the same)? Recent case law is
inconclusive. A trend favoring upholding these agreements may be
32.

See Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1976).
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discernible over the last twenty or thirty years. Where that trend will lead
over the next ten years, however, is not so clear. Scanning a farther horizon,
ex ante agreements to arbitrate will provide a limited, but useful, response to
the difficulties presented by adjudicating medical malpractice claims in court.
Nevertheless, the deep-seated tension and attendant uncertainties identified
above will probably limit its usefulness in the long run.
Might the limits on the availability and effectiveness of agreements to
arbitrate be avoided by imposing binding arbitration by statute? That appears
doubtful. At the state level, such an approach would confront substantial
difficulties on constitutional grounds. Adjusting substantive rights is one
thing: Courts that have concluded that a substantive legal change denies
claimants constitutionally guaranteed access to courts and to jury trial are
clearly bootstrapping; these procedural rights presuppose underlying
substantive rights but do not embody them. 33 In contrast, however, to hold
existing substantive rights in place and to force binding arbitration on tort
claimants would legitimately be found to run afoul of the "right-to-access"
and "jury trial" provisions in state constitutions.3 4 And while a federal statute
imposing binding arbitration would presumably avoid the constitutional
36
difficulties,3 5 such federal legislation appears unlikely.
III
PRETRIAL SCREENING PANELS

Slightly more than half of the states have statutes that require medical

malpractice claimants to take their cases before screening panels that include,
but are not limited to, medical people with appropriate professional expertise.
Although these panels are not adopted via contract, but rather are imposed by
statute, experience under them is relevant to the present inquiry inasmuch as
it sheds light on the possible gains to be realized by parties in other states
adopting such panels, or variations on that theme, by contract. The screening
panels determine whether the claim is meritorious.3 7 The procedures are
informal; the decisions are not binding. Thus, regardless of whether or not
the screening panel approves the claim, the claimant may proceed to full trial
in court. The hope, of course, is that claimants who receive a negative
assessment will not go on to trial, especially when that assessment is
admissible later in court or when the risks of litigating are increased by
33. Some state courts have disguised substantive due process objections to "no-fault"
legislation by holding that such statutes violate the right-to-access provisions of their state
constitutions. See, e.g., Sunspan Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffolding Co., 310 So. 2d 4
(Fla. 1975).
34. E.g., IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 18; KANSAS CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS § 18.
35. Cf Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
36. The medical malpractice "crisis" lacks a substantial interstate aspect-a provider typically
confronts the law of a single jurisdiction. In contrast, the so-called "products liability crisis" has a
significant interstate dimension, and yet even in this area federal reform legislation appears unlikely
in the near future.
37. See generally Sohn, supra note 2, at 682.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 49: No. 2

provisions charging additional litigation costs to a party losing in both
forums.
Although a few courts have had trouble with the constitutionality of these
screening statutes on the ground that admitting negative assessments
interferes with established judicial process, 38 this argument appears spurious
9
and has been rejected by a majority of courts that have considered it.3
Properly drafted statutes should pass constitutional muster.
The problem with these screening panels, then, is not so much with their
validity as with their utility. Some observers have concluded that screening
panels add a further layer of transaction costs that are not recaptured by net
gains in the form of weeding out weaker claims. 40 Once again, the problem is
probably traceable to the deep-level tension referred to earlier between
designing a screening panel that is potentially biased in favor of providersfor instance, a three-member panel, all of whom are health care providersand getting courts to approve such a panel as fundamentally fair to injured
recipients.
Might providers and recipients in states other than those with screening
panel statutes agree, ex ante, to submit malpractice claims to such a
procedure? It seems likely that such agreements would have an easier time of
it in court, given the less onerous implications for recipient-claimants.
However, contracts might face greater difficulties than do statutes in imposing
their terms on later tort actions. Private parties may not be able, via ex ante
contractual agreements, to determine what evidence is, and is not, admissible
at trial.
IV
CONCLUSION

Binding arbitration and screening panels offer limited benefits to health
care providers seeking to ease the difficulties they are encountering in medical
malpractice actions under existing law. Something of a dilemma is presented.
In order to pass muster with reviewing courts, these alternative arrangements
must make considerable concessions to the interests of health care recipients.
Once these concessions are made, one wonders how much help the
alternatives offer.
There might be more reason for optimism about alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms if the ongoing assumption that the substantive liability
rules are to be retained unchanged were relaxed. If a system such as the one
proposed in the Designated Compensable Event (DCE) Project 4 1 were to be
implemented, so that provider fault would no longer be the basis for plaintiffs'
38. See, e.g., Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976);
Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio App. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976).
39. See Lacy v. Green, 428 A.2d 1171, 1175 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981) (tabulation of cases).
40. See, e.g., Sohn, supra note 2, at 686-87.
41. Tancredi, Designing a No-Fault Alternative, LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 277,
280-83.
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recoveries in connection with most serious malpractice claims, binding
arbitration might play a more significant role. Indeed, were the DCE
approach implemented in connection with, for example, a prepaid health
benefits program, an agreement to submit disputes to binding arbitration
would have found a setting much more closely analogous to the traditional
settings of binding commercial or labor arbitration. The fit between
substance and process would, in that event, be better, and one could expect
the courts to react more favorably.

